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STATE V. CRUMPTON: HOW THE WASHINGTON STATE
SUPREME COURT IMPROVED ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN
POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING
Jordan McCrite*
Abstract: Post-conviction DNA testing is a valuable tool for ensuring innocent people are
not wrongfully incarcerated. Society has strong interests in confirming that available, yet
previously untested, DNA evidence matches the person convicted. Access to post-conviction
DNA testing, however, has been limited to maintain finality and avoid an over-burdened
court system. This Note examines post-conviction DNA testing in Washington State,
particularly after the 2014 Washington State Supreme Court decision, State v. Crumpton. In
Crumpton, a majority of the Court—over a strongly worded dissent—read a favorable
presumption into Washington’s post-conviction DNA testing statute. The favorable
presumption requires courts to presume the DNA test would be favorable to the petitioner,
thus making it easier for convicted persons to access testing. Given the trend in other states,
the astonishing number of exonerations, and the apparent falsity of the myth that DNA
requests are over-burdening courts, Washington’s interest in justice supports expanding
access to post-conviction DNA testing.

INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are incarcerated, spending day after day in prison for a
crime you did not commit. With each appeal, hope and fear fill your
mind. Ronald Cotton felt this way when he learned, after spending
eleven years in prison for a rape he did not commit, that a court granted
his motion for post-conviction DNA testing.1 Ronald describes the
period between the motion and the DNA results as a waiting game, a
time filled with nightmares:
I don’t know what I was more afraid of: the fact that this was my
last shot at freedom and it could all backfire like it had before, or
that it might work, and I would finally walk into the world
again. . . . I didn’t know how much more my nerves could take. I
resolved to put the case out of my mind. There was nothing
more I could do now.2
* The author interned for a county prosecuting attorney’s office during law school. While there,
she did not work on or learn of any matters relating to post-conviction DNA testing, or the statutes
and cases cited herein.
1. JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO, RONALD COTTON & ERIN TORNEO, PICKING COTTON: OUR
MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 175–76 (2009).
2. Id. at 176–78.
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On the other hand, imagine you were the victim of a horrendous
crime; you are trying to heal, and build a life outside of the pain inflicted
upon you. As each court date approaches, you anticipate closure, only to
find out there will be more court dates in your future. Jennifer
Thompson-Cannino, the victim in Ronald Cotton’s case, felt this way
upon learning a court granted the man convicted of raping her postconviction DNA testing.3 Police asked Jennifer to give a sample of her
blood for the laboratory to determine what DNA belonged to her and
what belonged to her attacker.4 Jennifer described how this felt:
I couldn’t believe how unfair it all was, that a twice-convicted
rapist who was supposed to be sent away to die in prison could
keep messing with my life. Weren’t the two trials enough?
There was a part of me that wanted to say, “Screw it, his lawyers
are going to have to come with a search warrant before they get
a drop of my blood.” And this, I thought, looking out at our
neatly mowed lawn and the tricycle parked by the garden, this is
mine, and Ronald Cotton has no right to encroach on any of it.
Still, the thought that this would go on any longer—that it would
keep coming back into my life—was enough to make me agree.
If this would finally make it go away, then I’d comply.5
These two perspectives illustrate the high stakes of post-conviction
review and the very real impact it can have on people’s lives. Although
there are many different post-conviction review procedures and
remedies, this Note focuses on post-conviction DNA testing. In
particular, this Note analyzes the right to post-conviction DNA testing in
Washington State under RCW 10.73.170, as the Washington State
Supreme Court recently interpreted it in State v. Crumpton.6
In State v. Crumpton, a jury convicted Lindsey Crumpton of five
counts of first degree rape and one count of residential burglary.7
Eighteen years after his conviction, Crumpton sought post-conviction
relief under RCW 10.73.170, which permits those in prison for a felony
to seek DNA testing of evidence.8 The trial court denied Crumpton’s
motion, and the court of appeals affirmed this denial.9 After granting
review, the Washington State Supreme Court held that in deciding
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 194–96.
Id. at 194–95.
Id. at 195–96 (emphasis in original).
181 Wash. 2d 252, 332 P.3d 448 (2014).
Id. at 255–57, 332 P.3d at 449–50.
Id. at 257, 332 P.3d at 450.
Id.
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whether to grant a motion for post-conviction DNA testing, a court
should presume the DNA test results would be favorable to the
petitioner.10 Then, the court must determine if such favorable,
exculpatory DNA results would demonstrate the petitioner’s innocence
on a more probable than not basis.11
This Note will examine the Crumpton decision and analyze why the
Washington State Supreme Court was sharply divided. Part I will first
explore the background of DNA testing and post-conviction DNA
remedies under both Washington State and federal law. Part I will also
discuss the Washington State Supreme Court cases on post-conviction
DNA testing pre-Crumpton. Part II will detail the facts of Crumpton as
well as the procedural background leading up to the Court’s decision.
Part III will describe the legal analysis of both the majority and
dissenting opinions, and explore how the justices’ analyses align with
policy goals. Part IV will examine how intermediate appellate courts
have applied Crumpton. Finally, Part V will evaluate the prudence of the
favorable presumption established in Crumpton by comparing
Washington State’s approach to DNA testing to the interpretations of
DNA statutes in other states.
I.

UNDERSTANDING POST-CONVICTION DNA
SCIENTIFICALLY AND LEGALLY

To understand the Washington State Supreme Court’s holding in
State v. Crumpton, this Note will first examine the scientific and legal
background of post-conviction DNA testing. First, this Part will provide
an overview of the science behind DNA testing, and how that science
can be useful—and not useful—in the courtroom. Then, the statutory
authority for post-conviction DNA testing in Washington State, as well
as its federal counterpart, will be explored. Finally, this Part details the
two primary Washington State Supreme Court decisions regarding postconviction DNA before Crumpton—State v. Riofta12 and State v.
Thompson.13

10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 264, 332 P.3d at 453.
Id.
166 Wash. 2d 358, 209 P.3d 467 (2009).
173 Wash. 2d 865, 271 P.3d 204 (2012).
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Scientific and Legal Foundations of DNA Evidence Used in PostConviction Review

Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a blueprint of an individual’s genetic
characteristics.14 DNA can be anywhere.15 The most commonly known
sources of DNA evidence are blood, semen, hair, skin, and saliva;
however, DNA can also be found on cigarette butts, bottles, clothing, or
even a phone.16 A “DNA match” occurs when a reference sample is
compared with evidence and the DNA profiles are the same.17 To make
this comparison, first, a technician produces a DNA profile from a
sample taken from the suspect—perhaps voluntarily or by court order.18
Second, a technician produces a DNA profile from the biological
evidence connected to the crime.19 Finally, the technician compares the
two samples’ genotypes, and if there is a match, the technician
determines the probability that a random person could have created the
match.20 This process produces an objective probability that the suspect
was the source of the biological evidence from the crime “to an
extremely high degree of confidence.”21
It is tempting to assume that a DNA match between a piece of
evidence and a suspect is determinative of that suspect’s guilt.22 Both
prosecutors and defense attorneys assign DNA evidence such “mythic
infallibility” as a forensic technique.23 This myth has led to the idea that
“DNA testing serves as a ‘truth machine’ that can definitively determine
guilt or innocence beyond doubt.”24 But as the United States Supreme
14. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DNA FOR THE DEFENSE BAR 3 (2012); see
also Aaron J. Lyttle, Return of the Repressed: Coping with Post-Conviction Innocence Claims in
Wyoming, 14 WYO. L. REV. 555, 573 (2014) (“Nucleic acids (adenine, thymine, guanine, and
cytosine) form nucleotide base pairs along a sugar phosphate backbone in a double spiral
structure—called a double helix. This material, . . . (DNA), provides instructions for the functioning
and development of living organisms.”).
15. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 8.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 18.
18. Lyttle, supra note 14, at 574.
19. Id. at 575.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS 1 (1999) (noting that DNA has become “the
foremost forensic technique for identifying perpetrators, and eliminating suspects”).
23. Jay D. Aronson, Certainty vs. Finality: Constitutional Rights to Postconviction DNA Testing,
in REFRAMING RIGHTS 125, 133 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2011).
24. Id.
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Court has recognized, “DNA testing alone does not always resolve a
case;” where there is an explanation for the DNA result and enough
incriminating evidence, DNA science alone will not prove innocence.25
The utility of DNA evidence is far more complicated. As articulated by
the National Institute of Justice:
When an individual is excluded as the potential source of DNA,
it does not necessarily mean the individual was not involved.
For example, a true perpetrator who left no detectable biological
material will be excluded as a source of DNA. Conversely, if an
individual is a potential source of DNA at a crime scene, it does
not necessarily mean that person was involved in the crime.26
Further, DNA tests do not always conclusively identify a particular
person.27 There may be inconclusive or uninterpretable results due to
complications such as multiple contributors, contamination, or
degradation of samples.28 Complexities in DNA matching may increase
more as scientific knowledge advances—for example, the increasing
awareness of people with chimeric DNA.29 Given the complexities of
DNA evidence, the dilemma has become “how to harness DNA’s power
to prove innocence without unnecessarily overthrowing the established
system of criminal justice.”30
DNA testing in criminal trials in the United States began in the mid1980s.31 Usually, a petitioner obtains post-conviction testing through
application under the law of the state of the conviction.32 By the end of

25. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 62 (2009).
26. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 18.
27. Id.; NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 28–29.
28. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 18; NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 28–
29.
29. Chimeric DNA arises when one person has two separate and distinct DNA strands in his
body, which could result in a DNA sample taken from a buccal swab not matching a semen sample
taken from the same person. Although beyond the scope of this Note, chimeric DNA could prove to
further complicate the legal landscape of post-conviction DNA testing. See Catherine Arcabascio,
Chimeras: Double the DNA-Double the Fun for Crime Scene Investigators, Prosecutors, and
Defense Attorneys?, 40 AKRON L. REV. 435 (2007) (exploring the current research on chimeric
DNA, its potential interaction with the criminal justice system, and, briefly, how it could impact
post-conviction DNA testing).
30. Osborne, 557 U.S. at 62.
31. Christine E. White, Comment, Clearly Erroneous: The Court of Appeals of Maryland’s
Misguided Shift to a Higher Standard for Post-Conviction DNA Relief, 71 MD. L. REV. 886, 889
(2012) (citing Osborne, 557 U.S. at 62).
32. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 158; see also Osborne, 557 U.S. at 62 (noting that
the task of harnessing “DNA’s power to prove innocence without unnecessarily overthrowing the
established system of criminal justice” belongs to state legislatures).
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2013, all fifty states had laws providing an avenue for post-conviction
DNA testing,33 but these statutes vary widely from state to state.34
According to the National Institute of Justice, “prosecutors frequently
consent either to testing or to a motion under the statute, and courts
routinely order testing on opposed motions under state statutes.”35
Unfortunately, there is not an abundance of case law interpreting the
states’ post-conviction DNA testing statutes across all states because of
the statutes’ infancy.36
Post-conviction DNA testing has had an incredible impact on the
criminal justice system. There have been 330 DNA exonerations across
the United States, and 140 actual perpetrators found as a result.37 DNA
exonerations have provided insight into the fallibility of particular types
of evidence and have opened the door for exonerations in all types of
cases, not just those involving DNA.38 For example, a DNA exoneration
could expose problems of eyewitness error or false confessions that are
not limited to cases that have DNA evidence.39 Overall, there have been
1650 exonerations across the United States, including DNA and nonDNA cases.40 In Washington State, of the reported thirty-seven
exonerations, four were the result of post-conviction DNA testing.41 If

33. John M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts’ Approaches to a Constitutional
Right of Actual Innocence: Is There a Need for a State Constitutional Right in New York in the
Aftermath of CPL § 440.10(G-1)?, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1453, 1474 (2013).
34. See Justin Brooks & Alexander Simpson, Blood Sugar Sex Magik: A Review of
Postconviction DNA Testing Statutes and Legislative Recommendations, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 799,
811–22 (2011) (exploring the varying one-step, two-step, or three-step requirements for petitioners
under different state statutes for post-conviction DNA testing); Lyttle, supra note 14, at 592–93
(setting forth the approaches by New York and Illinois—which were at the forefront of adopting
post-conviction DNA testing statutes—as well as the model legislation promulgated by the
Innocence Project).
35. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 158.
36. Id.
37. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://innocenceproject.org (last visited Aug. 24, 2015).
38. Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 573, 574–75 (2004).
39. Id.
40. The National Registry of Exonerations, Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, U. MICH.
L. SCH., http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-Year.aspx (last
visited Aug. 24, 2015).
41. The National Registry of Exonerations, U. MICH. L. SCH., http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx (on the “State” column heading, select “Washington” from the
dropdown list) (last visited Aug. 24, 2015). For more information about the exonerations in
Washington State, and to read the stories of the exonerees, see The Innocence Project Northwest,
Our Clients’ Stories of Innocence, U. WASH. SCH. L., http://www.law.washington.edu/
Clinics/IPNW/stories.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2015).
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not for post-conviction DNA testing, these four people would still be
wrongfully incarcerated. Without post-conviction DNA testing, and the
statutes that authorize it, people like Ronald Cotton42 would still be
incarcerated despite their innocence, and the actual perpetrators would
not have been identified. Thus, post-conviction DNA testing is an
invaluable tool for ensuring justice in the criminal justice system.
Because of the novelty of DNA statutes, however, there is limited case
law interpreting them, and post-conviction DNA testing remains a
critical area for research, judicial interpretation, and legislative action.43
B.

RCW 10.73.170: Washington Statutory Authority for PostConviction DNA Testing

As acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court, the task of
harnessing DNA’s power to prove innocence belongs to the
legislatures.44 In Washington State, RCW 10.73.170 is the statutory
authority for granting post-conviction DNA testing.45 In 2004, the
previous Washington statute46 authorizing post-conviction DNA testing
was set to expire, and the Washington legislature was on track to draft a
new statute to replace it.47 However, due to time constraints, the

42. See supra notes 1–5.
43. JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO
EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 246 (2000) (“A more
commanding view awaits further study by legal scholars and journalists of all innocence cases.”).
44. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 62 (2009) (noting that the task of harnessing
“DNA’s power to prove innocence without unnecessarily overthrowing the established system of
criminal justice” belongs to state legislatures).
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2014).
46. Id. § 10.73.170(1)–(2) (2004) That version stated:
(1) On or before December 31, 2004, a person in this state who has been convicted of a
felony and is currently serving a term of imprisonment and who has been denied
postconviction DNA testing may submit a request to the state Office of Public Defense, which
will transmit the request to the county prosecutor in the county where the conviction was
obtained for postconviction DNA testing, if DNA evidence was not admitted because the court
ruled DNA testing did not meet acceptable scientific standards or DNA testing technology was
not sufficiently developed to test the DNA evidence in the case. On and after January 1, 2005,
a person must raise the DNA issues at trial or on appeal.
(2) The prosecutor shall screen the request. The request shall be reviewed based upon the
likelihood that the DNA evidence would demonstrate innocence on a more probable than not
basis. The prosecutor shall inform the requestor and the state Office of Public Defense of the
decision, and shall, in the case of an adverse decision, advise the requestor of appeals rights.
Upon determining that testing should occur and the evidence still exists, the prosecutor shall
request DNA testing by the Washington state patrol crime laboratory. Contact with victims
shall be handled through victim/witness divisions.
Id.
47. H.R. REP. NO. 58-2872, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2004).
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legislature tabled it for the 2005 session.48
The stated purpose of the proposed legislation was to “ensure that a
process remains in place for cases where DNA tests could provide
evidence of a person’s innocence.”49 The testimony in support of the bill,
however, made clear that, “[b]y keeping the high ‘proof of innocence’
standard in the bill, the number of requests will remain low and testing
will only be ordered in cases where there is a credible showing that it
likely could benefit an innocent person.”50
The current statute authorizing post-conviction DNA testing, in
relevant part, reads:
(1) A person convicted of a felony in a Washington state court
who currently is serving a term of imprisonment may submit to
the court that entered the judgment of conviction a verified
written motion requesting DNA testing, with a copy of the
motion provided to the state office of public defense.
(2) The motion shall:
(a) State that:
(i) The court ruled that DNA testing did not meet
acceptable
scientific
standards;
or
(ii) DNA testing technology was not sufficiently
developed to test the DNA evidence in the case; or
(iii) The DNA testing now requested would be
significantly more accurate than prior DNA testing or
would provide significant new information;
(b) Explain why DNA evidence is material to the identity of
the perpetrator of, or accomplice to, the crime, or to
sentence enhancement, and
(c) Comply with all other procedural requirements
established by court rule.
(3) The court shall grant a motion requesting DNA testing under
this section if such motion is in the form required by subsection
(2) of this section, and the convicted person has shown the
likelihood that the DNA evidence would demonstrate innocence
on a more probable than not basis.51
The substantive requirement of RCW 10.73.170(3)—the primary focus
of this Note—is that a convicted person must show “the likelihood that
the DNA evidence would demonstrate innocence on a more probable

48.
49.
50.
51.

H.R. REP. NO. 59-1014, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005).
H.R. REP. NO. 58-2872, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2004).
Id.
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2014).
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than not basis.”52
C.

18 U.S.C. § 1300: Federal Statutory Authority for Post-Conviction
DNA Testing and How It Has Been Judicially Interpreted

In 2004, President Bush signed the Justice for All Act53 that, among
its protections for crime victims, included the Innocence Protection Act
of 2004.54 The Innocence Protection Act of 2004, in relevant part, reads:
(a) In General – Upon a written motion by an individual under a
sentence of imprisonment or death pursuant to a conviction for a
Federal offense (referred to in this section as the “applicant”),
the court that entered the judgment of conviction shall order
DNA testing of specific evidence if the court finds that all of the
following apply: (1) The applicant asserts, under penalty of
perjury, that the applicant is actually innocent . . . .
(6) The applicant identifies a theory of defense that—
(A) is not inconsistent with an affirmative defense
presented at trial; and
(B) would establish the actual innocence of the
applicant . . . .
(8) The proposed DNA testing of the specific evidence may
produce new material evidence that would—
(A) support the theory of defense referenced in
paragraph (6); and
(B) raise a reasonable probability that the applicant did
not commit the offense.55
The Innocence Protection Act established the Kirk Bloodsworth56
Post-Conviction DNA Testing Grant Program to award grants to states
to help defray the costs of post-conviction DNA testing.57 Congress had
three broad goals in establishing the Innocence Protection Act. At the
forefront, Congress intended to protect crime victims’ rights.58 Congress
also sought to improve the state of DNA analysis by eliminating the

52. Id.
53. Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (2004) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.)
54. H.R. REP. NO. 59-1014, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a) (2012).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a).
56. Kirk Bloodsworth was the first man in the United States sentenced to death but later cleared
because of DNA evidence. STANLEY COHEN, THE WRONG MEN 15 (Carroll & Graf 1st ed. 2003).
57. White, supra note 31, at 890 (citing Innocence Project Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118
Stat. 2284 (2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14136e (2004))).
58. H.R. REP. NO. 108-711, at 1 (2004).
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substantial backlog of DNA samples, improving and expanding DNA
testing capacity at federal and state crime laboratories, increasing
research and development of DNA testing technologies, and developing
new training programs for the collection and use of DNA evidence.59
Finally, Congress wanted to provide post-conviction DNA testing to
exonerate the innocent.60
Although Crumpton analyzed the Washington State post-conviction
DNA testing statute,61 the state legislature modeled the Washington
statute after the Innocence Protection Act.62 Thus, it is important to
understand how the Washington and federal statutes differ. For example,
the substantive requirements under the Washington statute require the
petitioner to demonstrate “the likelihood that DNA evidence would
demonstrate innocence on a more probable than not basis,”63 while,
under the federal statute, the petitioner must demonstrate DNA testing
would result in new material evidence that would raise a “reasonable
probability” of innocence.64 Neither of the statutes explicitly call for a
presumption that the DNA evidence would be favorable to the petitioner;
however, courts have applied both statutes with a favorable
presumption.65 Other approaches and the utility of explicit presumptions
will be discussed in Part V.66
The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet issued a decision
regarding the “reasonable probability” requirement found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3600.67 However, various circuit courts have interpreted the statute as

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 258, 332 P.3d 448, 450 (2014) (citing WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.73.170 (2014)).
62. Id. at 266, 332 P.3d at 454 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(8)(B) (2012).
65. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 264, 332 P.3d at 453; infra note 68.
66. See infra Part V.A.
67. The Supreme Court of the United States, in evaluating a post-conviction DNA claim out of
Alaska, has stated, “[a] criminal defendant proved guilty after a fair trial does not have the same
liberty interests as a free man.” Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68 (2009).
Therefore, he no longer has a presumption of innocence. Id. at 69. Although many courts, including
the Crumpton Court, cite Osborne in opinions regarding post-conviction DNA testing, see, e.g.,
Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 258, 332 P.3d at 450, the issues of Osborne were limited to the due
process rights of post-conviction DNA testing by the states. Osborne, 557 U.S. at 68–70. In holding
that Alaska’s procedures were not inconsistent with any recognized principle of fairness, the Court
did not further elaborate on the particular methods of review states should use or that which the
federal statute requires. Id. And the “presumption of innocence” concerned post-conviction testing
more broadly, which is distinct from the “favorable presumption” applied to DNA testing results.
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requiring a favorable presumption—even though there is no favorable
presumption written into the statute—when reviewing district court
decisions on post-conviction DNA testing motions.68 For example, in
United States v. Fields,69 the Fifth Circuit quoted the district court’s
reasoning in denying the petitioner’s motion: “even assuming that the
outcome of any DNA test would be favorable to [petitioner], he has not
established that such outcome would raise a reasonable probability of his
actual innocence” given the compelling evidence of his guilt presented at
trial.70 Therefore, although the reviewing court affirmed the denial of the
motion, the court evaluated the motion assuming a favorable result.
In drafting RCW 10.73.170, the Washington State House of
Representatives recognized that in order to receive federal funding to
further its goals of innocence protection, the bill needed to meet federal
standards, and drafted it to do so.71 The Washington State Supreme
Court has recognized the conformance of RCW 10.73.170 with the
Innocence Protection Act.72 Like RCW 10.73.170, there is no explicit
favorable presumption in the Innocence Protection Act.73
D.

Previous Decisions by the Washington State Supreme Court
Interpreting the State’s Post-Conviction Relief Statute

The leading case out of the Washington State Supreme Court
interpreting RCW 10.73.170 is State v. Riofta.74 The Court, in an opinion
authored by Chief Justice Madsen, held that a trial court is required to
grant a motion for post-conviction DNA testing when favorable results
would raise a reasonable probability that the petitioner was not the one
68. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 597 F. App’x 882 (7th Cir. 2015) (even presuming the
absence of petitioner’s DNA on tested materials, such testing would not disprove his involvement in
the drug conspiracy); United States v. Fields, 761 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2014) (assuming a favorable
DNA result); United States v. Pitera, 675 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2012) (even absence of DNA on tested
gun would not raise a reasonable probability of innocence); United States v. Jordan, 594 F.3d 1265
(10th Cir. 2010) (favorable DNA result is not inconsistent with the government’s theory of the case
such that it calls into question his guilt); United States v. Fasano, 577 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2009) (if
testing does not find petitioner’s DNA, the government’s strong case evaporates and a reasonable
probability of innocence is shown).
69. 761 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2014).
70. Fields, 761 F.3d at 479–80 (emphasis added).
71. H.R. REP. NO. 59-1014, Reg. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2005) (“In order to receive a portion of that
initiative funding, state law must conform with federal law. This bill as drafted meets those
standards.”).
72. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 266, 332 P.3d 448, 454 (2014).
73. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(8)(A)–(B) (2012), with Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 266, 332
P.3d at 454.
74. 166 Wash. 2d 358, 209 P.3d 467 (2009).
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who committed the crime.75 Riofta involved a gang-related shooting,
where the shooter dropped a white hat on the sidewalk as he fled the
scene.76 The victim had known Riofta for several years prior to the
shooting, identified him when police arrived, and subsequently picked
him from a photo montage.77 After his conviction for first degree assault
with a firearm, Riofta sought DNA testing of the white hat without
success.78 The trial court’s denial was affirmed by the court of appeals.79
In reviewing the denial of his motion for post-conviction DNA
testing, the Washington State Supreme Court began by analyzing the
procedural requirement of RCW 10.73.170.80 The Court stated the
statute “provides a means for a convicted person to produce DNA
evidence that the original fact finder did not consider,” for whatever
reason.81 Thus, even though the white hat at issue in Riofta was available
for testing at trial, DNA testing was not precluded by the procedural
requirement of RCW 10.73.170 on that basis because the hat had not
actually been tested at trial.82
The Court went on to analyze the substantive requirement of RCW
10.73.170.83 First, the Court recognized—as had been pointed out by the
court of appeals—that because more than one person could have worn
the hat, DNA test results excluding Riofta “would not show the
likelihood that he would demonstrate his innocence.”84 The Court went
on to say, “a court must look to whether, viewed in light of all of the
evidence presented at trial or newly discovered, favorable DNA test
results would raise the likelihood that the person is innocent on a more
probable than not basis.”85 Put differently, under the statute, a trial court
is required to “grant a motion for postconviction testing when
exculpatory results would, in combination with other evidence, raise a
reasonable probability the petitioner was not the perpetrator.”86 The
Court also reiterated that petitioners seeking post-conviction relief face a
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See id. at 373, 209 P.3d at 475.
Id. at 362, 209 P.3d at 469–70.
Id. at 362–63, 209 P.3d at 470.
Id. at 363, 209 P.3d at 470.
Id. at 364, 209 P.3d at 470.
Id. at 365–66, 209 P.3d at 471.
Id. at 366, 209 P.3d at 471.
Id. at 366, 209 P.3d at 472.
Id. at 367, 209 P.3d at 472.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 367–68, 209 P.3d at 472 (emphasis in original).
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“heavy burden.”87
After Riofta, the Washington State Supreme Court addressed the
denial of a motion under RCW 10.73.170 in State v. Thompson.88
Thompson involved the rape and beating of a woman at a hotel.89 The
victim met a man at a bar who invited her to an after-hours party at a
nearby hotel.90 The victim went to the man’s hotel room but soon
realized that no one else was present.91 She then attempted to leave, but
the perpetrator would not let her escape and began to brutally beat, rape,
and attempt to strangle and drown her, causing her to lose consciousness
many times.92 Responding police saw Thompson push the victim out of
the room where the rape occurred, and police arrested Thompson on the
scene.93 The victim suffered from memory problems due to the trauma,
and reported her attacker “might have had blond hair, did not have facial
hair, and was between 5’7” and 5’8” tall.”94 A jury found Thompson
guilty of first degree rape, and nine years later a court denied his motion
for post-conviction DNA testing.95
The Court in Thompson was primarily concerned with whether
evidence not admitted at trial could be used in a post-conviction DNA
testing motion.96 In Thompson’s case, the evidence was a statement
made by Thompson to arresting officers.97 The Court held the trial court
improperly relied on the unadmitted statement when denying testing.98
However, the Court also considered whether Thompson had met the
requisite substantive burden in his motion.99
In Thompson, the Court embraced the standard from Riofta, noting the
“statute requires a trial court to grant a motion for postconviction testing
87. Id. at 369, 209 P.3d at 473 (“[D]efendants seeking postconviction relief face a heavy burden
and are in a significantly different situation that a person facing trial.”).
88. 173 Wash. 2d 865, 271 P.3d 204 (2012).
89. Id. at 867, 271 P.3d at 205.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 867–68, 271 P.3d at 205.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 868, 271 P.3d at 205.
94. Id. at 869, 271 P.3d at 205.
95. Id. at 869, 271 P.3d at 206.
96. Id. at 872–73, 271 P.3d at 207.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 876, 271 P.3d at 209.
99. Id. at 874–76, 271 P.3d at 208–09. The Court only considered the limited issue of whether the
trial court erred when it considered evidence available to the State at the time of trial but not
admitted at trial. Therefore, the Court did not discuss the procedural burden Thompson had under
RCW 10.73.170. Id. at 871, 271 P.3d at 206–07.
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when exculpatory results would, in combination with the other evidence,
raise a reasonable probability the petitioner was not the perpetrator.”100
Emphasizing that there was only one perpetrator, the Court stated, “[i]f
DNA test results should conclusively exclude Thompson as the source of
the collected semen, it is more probable than not that his innocence
would be established, particularly in light of the weakness of the victim’s
identification of Thompson as her attacker.”101 Ultimately, the Court
agreed with the court of appeals that the trial court should have granted
Thompson’s motion for post-conviction DNA testing.102 Riofta and
Thompson set the stage for the Washington State Supreme Court to
decide Crumpton and the fate of post-conviction DNA testing in
Washington State.
II.

THE FACTS AND PROCEDURE OF CRUMPTON BEFORE
THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT

On April 10, 1993, D.E. awoke at 3:15 AM to a man standing in her
room.103 The man attacked D.E., pulled her clothing off, and covered her
head with pillows before raping her anally.104 The man raped D.E. five
times that night, rummaging through other rooms in her house between
each rape.105 After the last attack, the perpetrator rammed handkerchiefs
from a nightstand inside D.E., poured something cold on her, and
washed her.106 After the man fled, D.E. went to a neighbor’s house and
they called 911 around 5:15 AM.107 Because the attacker covered her
head during the attack, the only description D.E. could give of the man
was that he was “a big black man” who felt “greasy” and smelled of
cologne.108
At 5:23 AM, a responding officer noticed a heavy-set black man
running a half a mile from D.E.’s home.109 This man was Lindsey

100. Id. at 874, 271 P.3d at 208 (quoting State v. Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d 358, 367–68, 209 P.3d
467, 472 (2009)).
101. Id. at 875, 271 P.3d at 208 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 876, 271 P.3d at 209.
103. State v. Crumpton, 172 Wash. App. 408, 410, 289 P.3d 766, 767 (2012).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 411, 289 P.3d at 767.
108. Id. at 410–11, 289 P.3d at 767 (quoting State v. Crumpton, No. 17502-9-II, 1996 WL
1083334 (Wash. Ct. App. June 14, 1996), review denied, 130 Wash. 2d 1018, 928 P.2d 415 (1996)).
109. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 256, 332 P.3d 448, 449 (2014).
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Crumpton.110 The officer described the man’s skin as “wet looking,” said
he smelled of cologne, and stated he was carrying a piece of flowered
print bedding that appeared to have blood smears on it.111 In a search
incident to Crumpton’s arrest, officers found the following on his
person: a large quantity of women’s jewelry, a cigarette case, a ring
case, three soiled and oily white handkerchiefs, a flannel sheet, and a
telephone cord.112 Crumpton told officers he had just left his sister’s
house and was on the way to his mother’s house.113 Crumpton admitted
to being in D.E.’s house, but he denied raping D.E.114
The investigation at D.E.’s house revealed the front door forced open
and the bedroom in “complete disarray.”115 In the hallway, a telephone
cord was cut.116 A bottle of Crisco oil and a soaked handkerchief with a
“reddish stain” were found in D.E.’s bedroom.117 The oil caused any
fingerprints found to have no usable value.118 The sheet found on
Crumpton matched the sheet on D.E.’s bed, and D.E. identified the
jewelry, cigarette case, handkerchiefs, and other items as hers.119
Investigators discovered sperm on the rectal swab of D.E. and on her
sheets.120 In addition, investigators collected hairs from D.E.’s bedroom,
one of which “matched the characteristics of a pubic hair sample taken
from Crumpton.”121
The State charged Crumpton with five counts of first degree rape and
one count of residential burglary.122 The jury found him guilty as
charged.123 The judge sentenced Crumpton to an exceptional sentence

110. Crumpton, 172 Wash. App. at 411, 289 P.3d at 768.
111. Id. at 411, 289 P.3d at 768 (quoting Crumpton, 1996 WL 1083334).
112. Id. at 411–12, 289 P.3d at 768.
113. Id. at 412, 289 P.3d at 768.
114. Id. at 420, 289 P.3d at 772.
115. Id. at 412, 289 P.3d at 768 (quoting Crumpton, 1996 WL 1083334).
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting Crumpton, 1996 WL 1083334).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The items were not tested for DNA for the trial.
121. Id. at 413, 289 P.3d at 768 (quoting Crumpton, 1996 WL 1083334). Although beyond the
scope of this Note, it should be acknowledged that hair microscopy evidence has been criticized as
unreliable. See, e.g., Jessica D. Gabel & Margaret D. Wilkinson, “Good” Science Gone Bad: How
the Criminal Justice System Can Redress the Impact of Flawed Forensics, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1001,
1007 (2008) (raising concerns of the lack of peer review, no proficiency testing, high error rates,
and simple “eyeballing” that occurs with hair microscopy evidence).
122. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 257, 332 P.3d 448, 450 (2014).
123. Id.

11 - McCrite.docx (Do Not Delete)

1410

10/23/2015 12:50 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1395

based on deliberate cruelty and particular vulnerability of the victim. 124
Crumpton appealed, the court of appeals affirmed his conviction, and the
Washington State Supreme Court denied review.125
Eighteen years after his conviction, Crumpton petitioned for postconviction DNA testing under RCW 10.73.170 of the following: items
from the victim’s rape kit, a flannel sheet, two white handkerchiefs, and
hairs collected at the scene of the crime.126 The trial court denied
Crumpton’s motion for post-conviction DNA testing under RCW
10.73.170, finding that Crumpton had failed to show a reasonable
probability of his innocence.127 Crumpton appealed to Division II of the
Washington State Court of Appeals.128
The court of appeals subsequently issued a published opinion129 in
which it held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Crumpton’s post-conviction request for DNA testing under RCW
10.73.170.130 After articulating the abuse of discretion standard of
review,131 the court relied on Riofta’s interpretation of RCW 10.73.170
to affirm the trial court.132 Interpreting Riofta, the court of appeals
explained that when reviewing motions for post-conviction DNA testing,
the lower courts must consider whether, in light of all other evidence
presented at trial, favorable DNA results would demonstrate the
petitioner’s innocence on a more probable than not basis.133 Thus, the
court of appeals acknowledged the standard for reviewing such motions
is to presume favorable DNA results.
Despite its application of the favorable presumption, the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Crumpton’s motion.134 The
court agreed with the State that, when combined with other evidence, a
DNA test in this case would simply not raise an inference of
innocence.135 The court then weighed the various evidence presented at
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Crumpton, 172 Wash. App. at 413, 289 P.3d at 769.
127. Id. at 414, 289 P.3d at 769.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 408, 289 P.3d at 766.
130. Id. at 410, 289 P.3d at 767.
131. Id. at 416, 289 P.3d at 770 (citing State v. Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d 358, 370, 209 P.3d 467, 473
(2009)).
132. Id. at 418, 289 P.3d at 771 (citing Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d at 367, 209 P.3d at 472 (citing
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170(3) (2014))).
133. Id. (citing Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d at 367, 209 P.3d at 472).
134. Id. at 410, 289 P.3d at 767.
135. Id. at 419, 289 P.3d at 772.
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trial—including Crumpton’s presence near the home, his possession of
the victim’s belongings, and his admission to being in the home—
against the possibility of a favorable DNA test.136 The court found even
exculpatory DNA results would not exonerate Crumpton; “[i]n short,
DNA testing here would not likely change the outcome.”137
However, the three-judge panel was split two to one.138 The dissent
and majority agreed the rule for evaluating the motion was whether,
viewed in light of all evidence presented at trial, favorable DNA results
would raise a likelihood of innocence.139 But the dissent argued the
majority misapplied the rule by “basing its decision on the strength of
the evidence presented at trial and its conclusion that DNA evidence is
unlikely to help Crumpton.”140 Under the dissent’s approach, one must
not look at the strength of the evidence of guilt, for the evidence will
always be strong because a jury has already found the convicted person
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.141 Rather, the court must look to see
how the evidence stands up in the presence of a favorable DNA test
result.142 Crumpton sought review from the Washington State Supreme
Court, and the Court granted review in June of 2013.143
III.

STATE V. CRUMPTON: THE WASHINGTON STATE
SUPREME COURT DECISION

A.

Justice Fairhurst’s Majority Opinion: Reading a Favorable
Presumption into the Statute to Allow Petitioners Access to PostConviction DNA Testing

The Washington State Supreme Court announced State v. Crumpton
on August 21, 2014.144 Justice Fairhurst authored the opinion, with
Justices Johnson, Wiggins, González, Gordon McCloud, and Dwyer
concurring.145 Justice Stephens filed a dissenting opinion, with Justice
Owens and Chief Justice Madsen concurring.146 As characterized by the
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 419–20, 289 P.3d at 772.
Id. at 420, 289 P.3d at 772.
See generally id.
Id. at 422, 289 P.3d at 773 (Worswick, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (citing State v. Gray, 151 Wash. App. 762, 773, 215 P.3d 961 (2009)).
Id. (emphasis added).
State v. Crumpton, 177 Wash. 2d 1015, 306 P.3d 960 (2013) (order granting review).
State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 332 P.3d 448 (2014).
Id. at 255–64, 332 P.3d at 449–53.
Id. at 264–71, 332 P.3d at 453–57.
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majority, the issue facing the Court was, “the standard the court should
use to decide a motion for postconviction DNA testing and whether a
court should presume DNA evidence would be favorable to the
convicted individual when determining if it is likely the evidence would
prove his or her innocence.”147
After acknowledging the statute has procedural and substantive
components, and that the State conceded Crumpton met his procedural
burden, the Court began exploring the substantive portion of RCW
10.73.170.148 Crumpton argued the trial court should presume the DNA
results would be favorable in deciding whether to grant his motion for
post-conviction DNA testing.149 The State, on the other hand, argued
Crumpton must show the DNA evidence would demonstrate his
innocence on a more probable than not basis in light of all the other
evidence presented at trial to obtain testing.150
Before reaching its holding, the Court examined the statutory
requirements of RCW 10.73.170, the case law interpreting RCW
10.73.170, and the policy considerations supporting a finding of a
favorable presumption.151 The majority read a favorable presumption—
presuming a DNA test would be favorable to the petitioner—into RCW
10.73.170, thus expanding a petitioner’s right to post-conviction DNA
testing.152 The Court further recognized, “[w]hile the text of RCW
10.73.170(3) does not specifically mention a favorable presumption,
cases applying this statute and the substantive standard therein have
discussed the favorable results.”153
The first case the Court discussed was State v. Riofta.154 The Court
emphasized that in Riofta the Court applied the facts by looking at each
of the two possible favorable outcomes for Riofta: the absence of
Riofta’s DNA or the presence of another person’s DNA. 155 However,
because neither favorable result made Riofta’s innocence more or less

147. Id. at 255, 332 P.3d at 449.
148. Id. at 258–59, 332 P.3d at 450–51 (exploring the requirement that the person show “the
likelihood that the DNA evidence would demonstrate innocence on a more probable than not basis”
(citing WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170(2) (2014))).
149. Id. at 258, 332 P.3d at 449.
150. Id. at 258–59, 332 P.3d at 450–51.
151. Id. at 259–63, 332 P.3d at 451–53.
152. Id. at 260, 332 P.3d at 452.
153. Id. at 259, 332 P.3d at 451.
154. Id.; State v. Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d 358, 209 P.3d 467 (2009).
155. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 259–60, 332 P.3d at 451 (citing Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d at 370,
209 P.3d at 473–74).
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likely, the Court denied the testing.156 The majority concluded, “[t]he
Riofta court recognized that a court should assess the impact of an
exculpatory DNA test in light of all the evidence from trial when
deciding a motion for postconviction DNA [testing].”157 Therefore,
Riofta supported applying a favorable presumption when reviewing postconviction DNA motions.158
Next, the Court analyzed State v. Thompson.159 The majority focused
on the language in Thompson that discussed how any DNA evidence that
excluded him as a possible source would show Thompson’s innocence
on a more probable than not basis because it was a single perpetrator
rape case.160 The majority went on to conclude, “[l]ike the court in
Riofta, the Thompson court presumed the evidence would be favorable
to the convicted party to decide the motion.”161
The last case the Court analyzed in Crumpton was a court of appeals
decision, State v. Gray.162 Gray involved a single perpetrator rape and
attempted rape of two teenage girls that were camping with friends.163
The Crumpton Court explained, “[t]he [court of appeals] concluded that
if some of the evidence Gray requested be tested came back as not his
DNA, it would be material to his innocence and therefore the motion for
postconviction testing should be granted.”164 The Court went on to say
that Gray also recognized, “[i]f only one person committed the crime,
then the presence of other DNA would suggest innocence on a more
probable than not basis.”165

156. Id. (citing Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d at 370, 209 P.3d at 474–75).
157. Id. at 259–60, 332 P.3d at 451 (emphasis in original) (citing Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d at 369,
209 P.3d at 473).
158. See id.
159. Id. at 260, 332 P.3d at 451; State v. Thompson, 173 Wash. 2d 865, 271 P.3d 204 (2012).
160. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 260, 332 P.3d at 451 (citing Thompson, 173 Wash. 2d at 875,
271 P.3d at 208).
161. Id. (citing Thompson, 173 Wash. 2d at 875, 271 P.3d at 208).
162. Id.; State v. Gray, 151 Wash. App. 762, 215 P.3d 961 (2009).
163. Gray, 151 Wash. App. at 765, 215 P.3d at 963.
164. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 260, 332 P.3d at 451 (citing Gray, 151 Wash. App. at 774, 215
P.3d at 967). It should be noted that there were various pieces of evidence requested for testing in
Gray. Therefore, the court’s analysis of whether exculpatory DNA results would demonstrate
Gray’s innocence considered the various pieces of evidence and how they fit together, rather than
just one piece of evidence that may not alone be dispositive of Gray’s innocence. For example, the
court said, “if testing revealed a matching DNA profile from the swabs taken from C.S., and from
R.J.’s clothing or hair taken from her clothing, this evidence would be clearly material to the
identity of the perpetrator.” Gray, 151 Wash. App. at 772, 215 P.3d at 966.
165. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 260, 332 P.3d at 451 (citing Gray, 151 Wash. App. at 774, 215
P.3d at 967).
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The Court found Thompson and Gray were factually analogous to
Crumpton.166 According to the Court, “[e]ach case involved weak
identification evidence but otherwise had very strong physical and
circumstantial evidence tying the convicted individual to the crime.”167
The majority also focused on the cases having only a single
perpetrator.168 Single perpetrator cases are particularly important
because if there is only one possible DNA source, testing of that DNA
would bear heavily on a person’s guilt or innocence.169 As the Court
explained, “[a]ny DNA evidence left on the items Crumpton petitioned
to test would almost certainly have been left by the perpetrator of the
rape. Exculpatory results of DNA testing in this case would directly
affect the likelihood Crumpton was innocent.”170 Therefore, the Court
concluded, as the courts in Thompson and Gray had done, it too must
grant post-conviction DNA testing, “even in the context of all the strong
evidence of guilt.”171
The Court reaffirmed Riofta’s conclusion that the legislature intended
the substantive requirement in the statute to be “onerous.”172 The Court
recognized the important balance between the opportunities for
exonerations with DNA testing and the potential that laboratories will be
overburdened and state resources wasted by frivolous requests.173
However, the majority described reading a favorable presumption into
RCW 10.73.170 as “the appropriate analytical method for achieving the
most just resolution to these motions.”174 The Court aimed to create a
standard that is “onerous but reasonable enough to let legitimate claims
survive.”175 The Court further cautioned against focusing on the
overwhelming physical and circumstantial evidence against Crumpton,
because there will always be strong evidence against a convicted
individual as they were convicted of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.176
166. Id. at 261, 332 P.3d at 452.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. (citing State v. Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d 358, 367, 209 P.3d 467, 472 (2009)). Although the
Court in Crumpton does not define “onerous,” Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “[e]xcessively
burdensome or troublesome; causing hardship.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1198 (9th ed. 2009).
173. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 261–62, 332 P.3d at 452.
174. Id. at 261, 332 P.3d at 452.
175. Id. at 262, 332 P.3d at 452.
176. Id.
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The Court ultimately held:
Case law supports using a favorable presumption when deciding
whether to grant a motion for postconviction DNA testing. We
formally hold that this presumption is part of the standard in
RCW 10.73.170. A court should look to whether, considering all
the evidence from trial and assuming an exculpatory DNA test
result, it is likely the individual is innocent on a more probable
than not basis. If so, the court should grant the motion and allow
testing to be done. Only then can it be determined whether the
DNA actually exculpates the individual and if the results could
be used to support a motion for a new trial.177
Because the majority found there was no indication the trial court had
applied the favorable presumption, they found the trial court abused its
discretion.178 Thus, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial
court to apply the proper standard in reviewing Crumpton’s motion for
post-conviction DNA testing.179 The Court also dictated the result:
“[u]sing this presumption Crumpton’s motion must be granted.”180
B.

Justice Stephens’s Dissenting Opinion: Focusing on Legislative
Intent to Limit Post-Conviction DNA Testing

Justice Stephens authored a dissenting opinion joined by Justice
Owens and Chief Justice Madsen.181 The dissent concluded that
Crumpton’s motion for post-conviction DNA testing should have been
denied because he did not meet his statutory burden, the plain language
and legislative intent of RCW 10.73.170 did not support a favorable
presumption, and the precedent did not require a favorable
presumption.182
First, the dissent looked to the language of the statute, which does not
contain an explicit “favorable presumption.”183 The substantive
requirement of the statute provides the petitioner must show “the
likelihood that the DNA evidence would demonstrate innocence on a
more probable than not basis.”184 Further, the federal statute, which

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 261–62, 332 P.3d at 451–52.
Id. at 263–64, 332 P.3d at 453.
Id. at 264, 332 P.3d at 453.
Id. at 261, 332 P.3d at 452.
Id. at 264, 271, 332 P.3d at 453, 457 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 271, 332 P.3d at 456–57.
Id. at 264, 332 P.3d at 453.
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170(2) (2014).
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Justice Stephens characterized as the “driving force” behind RCW
10.73.170, contains no explicit favorable presumption.185 Justice
Stephens noted, “[a]s is the case with the Washington statute, the burden
under the federal statute is heavy. A petitioner who has already been
convicted does not enjoy the same liberties as existed prior to trial; the
‘presumption of innocence disappears.’”186
Second, the dissent addressed the statute’s legislative history.187 At
the forefront, the dissent recognized the delicate balance the legislature
sought between “society’s interest in justice with its interest in finality”
in matters that have already been decided by a jury. 188 The balance
struck placed a high burden—an onerous standard—on obtaining postconviction DNA testing.189 “As the legislature explained, ‘[b]y keeping
the high “proof of innocence” standard in the bill, the number of
requests will remain low and testing will only be ordered in cases where
there is a credible showing that it likely could benefit an innocent
person.’”190 To the dissent, the legislative history was evidence that “the
legislature intended to create an avenue, not a freeway, for postconviction DNA testing.”191
Third, the dissent expressed concern about how the statute, read with
the favorable presumption, would apply in single perpetrator rape
cases.192 The dissent argued that a favorable presumption eliminates the
onerous statutory burden under RCW 10.73.170 because a petitioner
“must present a theory of innocence and not simply contend, ‘I didn’t do
it’” to meet the rigorous statutory standard.193 According to the dissent,
185. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 266, 332 P.3d at 454; see 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a) (2012).
186. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 266, 332 P.3d at 454 (quoting Dist. Attorney’s Office v.
Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68–69 (2009)). It must be noted that the “presumption of innocence” and the
“favorable presumption” for DNA testing are very different. The “presumption of innocence”
language is used by Justice Stephens here to explain why federal courts have applied a “heavy
burden” for relief under the federal statute, not to equate the standards. See id.
187. Id. at 265–66, 332 P.3d at 454.
188. Id. at 265, 332 P.3d at 454.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 265–66, 332 P.3d at 454 (alteration in original) (quoting H.B. REP. NO. 58-2872, Reg.
Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2004)).
191. Id. at 266, 332 P.3d at 454. Notably, Chief Justice Madsen wrote the majority opinion in
Riofta, the case relied on most heavily by the Court in Crumpton. Although the Chief Justice did not
write a dissenting opinion in Crumpton to illuminate her exact reasoning, it is difficult to reconcile
the majority’s analysis of Riofta with her dissenting vote in Crumpton. If interpreting Riofta
necessitates finding a favorable presumption in RCW 10.73.170, as the majority characterized, then
it is surprising that the justice who wrote that opinion seems to disagree with that interpretation.
192. Id. at 267, 332 P.3d at 455.
193. Id.
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Crumpton rested his motion on nothing more than the contention that,
because this is a single perpetrator rape case, DNA evidence would
prove his innocence; Crumpton did not advance any new theory of
defense, nor did he show any link between DNA testing and his
innocence.194
Justice Stephens also argued that policy considerations supported not
reading a favorable presumption into RCW 10.73.170 because of the
impact of the presumption in single perpetrator cases.195 The favorable
presumption may be seen as taking discretion away from the trial courts
in single perpetrator cases to consider each possible DNA testing
result—whether favorable, inconclusive, or negative.196 As the dissent
said, the legislature “vested discretion in the trial court to consider the
evidence at trial in conjunction with any new evidence and the
possibility of favorable DNA results . . . . [C]onclusively applying a
favorable presumption practically eliminates the trial court’s discretion
in a single perpetrator rape case.”197
Fourth, the dissent distinguished the cases that guided the majority’s
analysis.198 Beginning with Riofta, the dissent took issue with the
majority’s characterization of the issue presented.199 The court of
appeals holding that caused concern in Riofta was that a petitioner must
demonstrate his innocence based on the DNA test results alone.200
According to the dissent, the Court in Riofta never considered whether
RCW 10.73.170 required a favorable presumption, and nothing in Riofta
“supports a reading of the statute that would allow the petitioner in a
case such as this to rest on the presumption of favorable test results
alone.”201
The dissent also found Thompson was not factually analogous to
Crumpton because of the weak identification of the attacker by the
victim.202 The victim in Thompson did not get a good look at the
perpetrator, she lost consciousness several times, had lapses in memory,
and there was a lack of corroborating evidence, such as injuries on
194. Id. at 268, 332 P.3d at 455.
195. Id. at 267–68, 332 P.3d at 455.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 267, 332 P.3d at 455.
198. Id. at 268–71, 332 P.3d at 455–56.
199. Id. at 269, 332 P.3d at 455.
200. Id. at 264, 332 P.3d at 453 (citing State v. Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d 358, 367, 209 P.3d 467, 472
(2009)).
201. Id. at 269, 332 P.3d at 456.
202. Id. at 270, 332 P.3d at 456.
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Thompson.203 The facts in Crumpton, as the dissent described, were “not
nearly as precarious” because Crumpton admitted to being in the house,
police found him nearby, he had the victim’s possessions on him, and
the victim’s description of her attacker was consistent with Crumpton’s
physical features.204
Finally, the dissent expressed concern that shifting the focus away
from whether the petitioner had shown innocence on a more probable
than not basis may “create a revolving door for individuals already
convicted beyond a reasonable doubt to postpone finality and burden the
system with requests for DNA testing solely on the ground that new
DNA technology now exists.”205 In conclusion, the dissent reasoned,
“[r]ather than reading a favorable presumption into the language of
RCW 10.73.170, we should require the petitioner to show what the
statute’s plain language demands—a ‘likelihood that the DNA evidence
would demonstrate innocence on a more probable than not basis.’”206
The dissent stated Crumpton did not meet this evidentiary burden;
rather, the majority’s favorable presumption satisfied the burden for
him.207
IV.

HOW CRUMPTON HAS BEEN APPLIED: INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURTS HAVE APPLIED CRUMPTON’S
FAVORABLE PRESUMPTION TO AFFIRM DENIALS OF
MOTIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING

There has been little judicial application of Crumpton’s favorable
presumption in the months since its enactment. As of this writing, there
have been three unpublished intermediate appellate decisions citing
Crumpton.208 In these cases, the courts applied a favorable presumption
but, nonetheless, affirmed the denial of post-conviction DNA testing
under RCW 10.73.170.209
The first case, decided by a three judge panel in Division III of the
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 268, 332 P.3d at 455.
206. Id. at 271, 332 P.3d at 457 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2014)).
207. Id. at 268, 332 P.3d at 455.
208. See State v. Allen, No. 31578-9-III, 2014 WL 5089235 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2014); State
v. Tovar, No. 70721–3–I, 2015 WL 540903 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2015); State v. Jones, No.
32182–7–III, 2015 WL 3618633 (Wash. Ct. App. June 9, 2015). Jones will not be discussed further
because Jones’s motion was denied because no DNA evidence was ever collected. Jones, 2015 WL
3618633, at *1. Therefore, there was no evidence available for post-conviction testing.
209. See Allen, 2014 WL 5089235; Tovar, 2015 WL 540903.
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Washington State Court of Appeals, is State v. Allen.210 In that case, a
jury convicted Anthony Allen of kidnapping and assault.211 Allen filed a
motion for post-conviction DNA testing under RCW 10.73.170, and the
superior court denied his motion.212 The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court, holding that “[a]lthough DNA testing serves a worthwhile
purpose, its employment is not helpful here, since the victims of the
crimes were acquaintances of Anthony Allen and would not misidentify
him. Thus, the statutory basis to compel DNA testing is not satisfied.”213
The court in Allen specifically stated that Riofta controlled its
decision.214 The opinion cites Crumpton when detailing the factual
background of post-conviction DNA testing cases in Washington.215
After applying the standard set forth in Riofta, the court in Allen simply
said, “[c]ase law supports using a favorable presumption when deciding
whether to grant a motion for post-conviction DNA testing.”216 The
court did not cite to Crumpton for this proposition; in fact, there was no
citation at all.217 However, the recognition of a favorable presumption
when evaluating motions under RCW 10.73.170 is consistent with the
holding of Crumpton.218
The second case, decided by a three judge panel in Division I of the
Washington State Court of Appeals, is State v. Tovar.219 In that case, a
jury had convicted Michael Tovar of second degree rape while armed
with a deadly weapon.220 Tovar’s argument in support of post-conviction
DNA testing was that a favorable DNA result would demonstrate the
victim had lied when she testified she was monogamous with Tovar;
therefore, she was not a credible witness against him.221 Tovar’s defense

210. See Allen, 2014 WL 5089235.
211. Id. at *1.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at *4. Allen is factually analogous to Riofta as they both involve an object which could
have been readily used by multiple people, therefore it could have multiple DNA sources. In Allen
the evidence in question was a kitchen knife, whereas in Riofta the evidence was a baseball hat. Id.
at *4; State v. Riofta, 166 Wash. 2d 358, 362, 209 P.3d 467, 469–70 (2009).
215. Allen, 2014 WL 5089235, at *4.
216. Id. at *3.
217. Id.
218. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 260, 332 P.3d 448, 452 (2014) (holding that “[a]
court should look to whether, considering all the evidence from trial and assuming an exculpatory
DNA test result, it is likely the individual is innocent on a more probable than not basis”).
219. No. 70721–3–I, 2015 WL 540903 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2015).
220. Id. at *1.
221. Id.
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at trial was consent.222 The superior court denied Tovar’s motion for
post-conviction DNA testing under RCW 10.73.170,223 and the court of
appeals affirmed the denial because a favorable DNA test “would not
raise a reasonable probability of Tovar’s innocence.”224
The court in Tovar, unlike the court in Allen, specifically relied on
Crumpton in reaching its decision. The court stated that “[w]hen
determining if it is likely the DNA evidence would demonstrate
innocence, ‘a court should presume DNA evidence would be favorable
to the convicted person.’”225 After relying on the standard set forth in
Crumpton, the court distinguished Crumpton factually from Tovar.226
The court found that in Crumpton, the perpetrator’s identity was at issue,
and therefore, exculpatory DNA results would affect the likelihood of
innocence.227 On the other hand, in a defense of consent or excuse, as
Tovar had raised, an exculpatory DNA result would not exclude Tovar
as the perpetrator, but only shed light on the victim’s credibility. 228
Therefore, the DNA evidence would “add little” to determining Tovar’s
innocence and the motion for post-conviction DNA testing was properly
denied.229
These two cases illustrate how lower courts are beginning to apply
Crumpton. Interestingly, Tovar involved a single-perpetrator where the
court applied a favorable presumption but still denied the motion for
post-conviction DNA testing,230 a scenario that Justice Stephens
dissenting in Crumpton expressed concern could not happen when
applying the favorable presumption.231 However, unlike in Crumpton, in
both Allen and Tovar the identity of the perpetrator was not the primary
issue.232 Therefore, although the impact of Crumpton on post-conviction
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at *2 (citing State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 255, 332 P.3d 448, 449 (2014)).
226. Id. at *3.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at *1.
231. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 268, 332 P.3d 448, 455 (2014) (Stephens, J.,
dissenting).
232. Id. at 256–57, 332 P.3d at 450 (majority opinion) (noting that Crumpton admitted to being in
the victim’s house but denied hitting or raping her); State v. Allen, No. 31578-9-III, 2014 WL
5089235, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2014) (noting the victims knew Allen and would not
misidentify him); State v. Tovar, 2015 WL 540903, at *3 (noting Tovar’s defense was consent or
excuse).
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DNA testing motions is still unclear, these cases demonstrate a
willingness in the courts to take into consideration the entire body of
evidence before determining whether to permit testing rather than letting
the favorable presumption create a “revolving door.”233 As time passes,
courts will likely further interpret the favorable presumption set forth in
Crumpton and there will be more evidence of its successes and failures.
V.

READING A FAVORABLE PRESUMPTION INTO RCW
10.73.170 ALIGNS WITH THE APPROACHES OF OTHER
STATES, LEGISLATIVE GOALS OF JUSTICE, AND
SOCIETY’S DESIRE TO EXONERATE THE INNOCENT

This Part will consider the prudence of the Court’s favorable
presumption. First, this Part will compare Crumpton’s requirement of a
favorable presumption to the approaches of post-conviction DNA testing
in other states. Then, the alignment of the favorable presumption with
both federal and state legislative goals of justice will be examined.
Finally, this Part will argue that the favorable presumption properly
furthers policy goals of avoiding incarcerating the innocent, particularly
because the fear of courts being overburdened by requests for DNA
testing has not yet played out in Washington courts.
A.

A Favorable Presumption Is Consistent with the Statutes of Other
States

Many states have avoided the question the Washington State Supreme
Court faced in Crumpton because their statutes explicitly state that
evaluation of post-conviction DNA testing motions should presume
“exculpatory results.”234 Texas’s statute, for example, requires DNA
testing if the court finds “the person would not have been convicted if
exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing.”235 Texas
appellate courts have explained the task under the statute is not to
determine the likelihood of a favorable DNA result; rather, the statute
demands the court “assume that the results of the DNA testing would

233. See Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 268, 332 P.3d at 455 (Stephens, J., dissenting) (“The effect
[of the favorable presumption], at least in single perpetrator rape cases, is to create a revolving door
for individuals already convicted beyond a reasonable doubt to postpone finality and burden the
system with requests for DNA testing solely on the ground that new DNA technology now exists.”).
234. Brooks & Simpson, supra note 34, at 81.
235. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)
(emphasis added).
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prove favorable to appellant.”236 Hawaii’s statute requires a court to
order DNA testing if it finds “[a] reasonable probability exists that the
defendant would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory
results had been obtained through DNA analysis, even if the defendant
later pled guilty or no contest.”237 The model post-conviction DNA
testing statute promulgated by the Innocence Project also contains
explicit favorable presumption language.238
In 2013, Oklahoma became the final state to pass a law permitting
post-conviction DNA testing.239 The text of Oklahoma’s statute
explicitly requires that reviewing judges apply a favorable presumption
to DNA testing results.240 The statute reads: “A court shall order DNA
testing only if the court finds . . . [a] reasonable probability that the
petitioner would not have been convicted if favorable results had been
obtained through DNA testing at the time of the original prosecution.”241
Oklahoma promulgated the statute after recognizing that it was the
only state without access to post-conviction DNA testing.242 The
Oklahoma Justice Commission—the group that prompted the drafting of
the legislation243—detailed the shortcomings of laws in other states it
sought to overcome.244 The Commission recognized that the laws of
many other states presented insurmountable hurdles to the petitioner,
placing the burden on the defense to “effectively solve the crime and
prove that the DNA evidence promises to implicate another
individual.”245 The Commission recommended a “reasonable standard”
to establish proof of innocence.246 The proposed legislation required a
236. In re Morton, 326 S.W.3d 634, 641 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010).
237. HAW. REV. STAT. § 844D-123(a)(1) (emphasis added).
238. INNOCENCE PROJECT, MODEL LEGISLATION: AN ACT CONCERNING ACCESS TO POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING 3 (2012), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/freeinnocent/improve-the-law/Access_to_Post_Conviction_DNA_Testing_Model_Bill.pdf
(“A
reasonable probability that the petitioner would not have been convicted or would have received a
lesser sentence if favorable results had been obtained through DNA testing at the time of the
original prosecution.” (emphasis added)).
239. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1373.4(A)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.); see
OKLA. JUSTICE COMM’N, REPORT TO THE OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION 24 (2013) (noting that
Oklahoma was the last state in the United States to not have a post-conviction DNA testing law).
240. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1373.4(A)(1).
241. Id. (emphasis added).
242. OKLA. JUSTICE COMM’N, supra note 239, at 24.
243. Press Release, Okla. Bar Ass’n, Oklahoma Justice Commission Issues Final Report,
Adjourns (Mar. 1, 2013), available at http://www.okbar.org/news/Recent/2013/DNATesting.aspx.
244. OKLA. JUSTICE COMM’N, supra note 239, at 24.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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finding that there is “a reasonable probability that the petitioner would
not have been convicted if favorable results had been obtained through
DNA testing at the time of the original prosecution.”247 The legislature
ultimately adopted the Commission’s proposed language.248 Thus,
Oklahoma’s solution to the insurmountable hurdles petitioners faced in
other states was to include an explicit favorable presumption in its
statute.
Since the 2013 enactment of the Oklahoma post-conviction DNA
testing statute two appellate opinions have addressed it.249 In State ex rel.
Smith v. Neuwirth,250 an appellate court reversed a lower court’s grant of
post-conviction DNA testing on procedural grounds.251 The lower court
judge, in granting the motion for post-conviction DNA testing, reasoned:
In looking at the statute itself . . . a reasonable probability the
petitioner would not have been convicted if favorable results had
been obtained . . . . I don’t understand how you could ever deny
that, if you have favorable results, they are such that they show
exculpatory evidence . . . . I don’t believe under the statute I
have any other decision other than to allow it.252
In reversing this decision, the appellate court found that the trial court
abused its discretion by finding a reasonable probability that favorable
DNA results would have prevented the conviction.253 The court reversed
because the petitioner failed to include the statutorily required affidavit
in his motion requesting DNA testing.254 Despite its reversal, the
appellate court focused only on the procedural shortcoming—the
missing affidavit—and did not criticize the commentary of the lower
court judge that the favorable presumption generally requires the
granting of post-conviction DNA testing.255
Other states—such as Georgia and Iowa, as well as the District of
247. Id. at 83.
248. Compare id. (“[A] reasonable probability that the petitioner would not have been convicted
if favorable results had been obtained through DNA testing at the time of the original
prosecution.”), with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1373.4(A)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st
Reg. Sess.) (adopting the exact same language).
249. State ex rel. Smith v. Neuwirth, 337 P.3d 763 (Okla. 2014) (explored in detail below);
Watson v. State, 343 P.3d 1282, 1283 (Okla. 2015) (holding the petitioner was procedurally barred
from filing a second motion for post-conviction DNA testing).
250. 337 P.3d 763 (Okla. 2014).
251. Id. at 764.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 766.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 766–67.
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Columbia—have post-conviction DNA testing statutes that contain
ambiguous “reasonable probability” language and no explicit favorable
presumption.256 For example, the California Penal Code requires, among
other things, that the petitioner “[e]xplain, in light of all the evidence,
how the requested DNA testing would raise a reasonable probability that
the convicted person’s verdict or sentence would be more favorable if
the results of DNA testing had been available at the time of
conviction.”257
Scholars have criticized the California statute because its ambiguous
standard could lead to frustration of the statute’s purpose: 258
The only way the statute can be interpreted without frustrating
its purpose is to take a “one-step” approach. The court should
determine whether the result of a favorable DNA test could
produce evidence that, even when considering all the evidence
produced at trial, creates a reasonable probability the convicted
person’s verdict or sentence would have been more favorable if
the results of the DNA testing had been available at the time of
trial. If the court fails to make the presumption of a favorable
DNA testing result, the statute can never achieve its purpose.259
The scholars argue post-conviction DNA statutes that purport to have the
purpose of ensuring justice must be read with a favorable
presumption.260 Although the “reasonable probability” language may be
ambiguous, the Supreme Court of California later read a favorable
presumption into the statute.261 Twice in that opinion, the Court stated
the trial court’s decision included assuming a DNA test result favorable
to the petitioner.262
It is important to note that President Bush did not sign the Innocence
Protection Act into law until 2004.263 Many of the developments in state
law allowing for post-conviction DNA testing have occurred—or
advanced—after the passage of the federal statute. For example, the
Innocence Protection Act influenced the Washington State post-

256. Brooks & Simpson, supra note 34, at 812.
257. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(d)(1)(D) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
258. Brooks & Simpson, supra note 34, at 812 (emphasis in original).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Richardson v. Superior Court, 183 P.3d 1199, 1201 (Cal. 2008). Although the decision predates the most recent 2015 version of the statute, the relevant language in the new version remains
unchanged. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(c)(1)(B) (2005).
262. Richardson, 183 P.3d at 1203, 1205–06.
263. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a) (2012).
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conviction DNA statute, as seen in its legislative history.264 Given
Washington and California’s eventual reading of a favorable
presumption into their statutes, and the many statutes that explicitly have
a favorable presumption, post-conviction DNA law may be in a state of
transition to expand access to justice.265 Therefore, if the expansion of
access to justice is occurring in other states, the majority’s favorable
presumption in Crumpton is consistent with that legal trend.
B.

A Favorable Presumption Is Consistent with the Legislative Goals
of Justice

Beyond the statutory text explored above, Crumpton’s favorable
presumption is consistent with the overarching legislative goals of
justice as articulated by both the federal and Washington State
legislatures. Congress passed the Innocence Protection Act with an
understanding that the desired path to justice was a complicated one.266
Opening the hearing before the United States Senate on post-conviction
DNA testing in 2000, Senator Orrin Hatch made the following remarks:
No one here today will quarrel with the assertion that postconviction DNA testing should be made available when it serves
the ends of justice. Reaching agreement on a practical definition
for justice, however, is a difficult and different matter. After all,
justice does mean different things to different people. . . . [W]e
have an obligation to balance the adequacy of procedural
protections afforded to defendants against the need for integrity
and finality in State and Federal courts. It is my hope that in
holding this hearing, we can take a first step toward reaching
consensus on how best to strike this balance in the area of postconviction DNA testing, and in doing so serving, of course, the
cause of justice.267
As the hearing continued, the various witnesses and senators debated the
appropriate standard necessary to carry out their goals of justice,
particularly if the testing should presume an exculpatory result.268 In the
264. See H.R. REP. NO. 59-1014, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005) (recognizing the need to conform to
the Justice for All Act in order to obtain federal funding for post-conviction DNA testing).
265. See CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES 3–6 (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed. 2014) (summarizing
the beginning, and continuing momentum, of the “innocence revolution”).
266. See Post-Conviction DNA Testing: When Is Justice Served?: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 1 (2000).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 98. (“[T]he court in ordering DNA testing has to determine that testing would produce
non-cumulative exculpatory evidence relevant to the claim.” (statement of Sen. Leahy)); cf. id. at
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end, the Innocence Protection Act was passed with the requirement that
the proposed DNA testing may produce new material evidence that
would “raise a reasonable probability that the applicant did not commit
the offense,”269 rather than an explicit presumption of an exculpatory
result.
This complex balance between the rights of convicted persons and
societal interests in finality continued to permeate the debate on postconviction DNA testing after the passage of the Innocence Protection
Act. Years later, the Washington legislature grappled with this balance
as it formulated RCW 10.73.170.270 Washington weighed the need to
“ensure that a process remains in place for cases where DNA tests could
provide evidence of a person’s innocence” against the desire to minimize
the number of requests by “keeping the high ‘proof of innocence’
standard in the bill.”271 Although the legislature weighed both
considerations of justice, ultimately the intent was to maintain the high
proof of innocence standard in order to limit testing to cases where
credible DNA testing “could benefit an innocent person.”272 The Court
continues to describe this standard as “onerous.”273
It is difficult to reconcile the legislative intent to maintain an onerous
standard for post-conviction DNA testing with the favorable
presumption the Court reads into RCW 10.73.170. There is, of course,
an argument that if the legislature intended for there to be a favorable
presumption, they would have written it into the statute as many other
states had done. The State, in its response brief filed with the Court for
Crumpton, even argued the policy statements being raised had been
“plainly considered and rejected by the Legislature when it enacted the
statute.”274 However persuasive this reliance on purported legislative
intent may be, its weight in the ultimate evaluation of Crumpton’s
favorable presumption must be balanced against the aforementioned
overarching legislative goals of justice that are furthered by the
favorable presumption.

107 (“[R]equiring granting of DNA typing so long as that evidence is . . . relevant and
exculpatory[,] . . . . that is a standard that is of some difficulty to me” (statement of George Clarke)).
269. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(8)(B) (2012).
270. H.R. REP. NO. 58-2872, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2004).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 261, 332 P.3d 448, 452 (2014) (citing State v. Riofta,
166 Wash. 2d 358, 367, 209 P.3d 467, 472 (2009)).
274. Brief for Respondent at 18, State v. Crumpton, 172 Wash. App. 408, 389 P.3d 766 (2012)
(No. 42173-9-II).
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A Favorable Presumption Advances Society’s Desire to Avoid
Incarcerating the Innocent and Will Not Likely Overburden the
Courts

The number of exonerations that have occurred across the nation is
astonishing,275 and the litigation resulting from post-conviction DNA
testing motions has been sparse.276 One reason for this, cited by the
National Institute of Justice, is that often the State will simply consent to
a petitioner’s request for post-conviction DNA testing, obviating the
need for further litigation.277 In fact, the guidelines promulgated by the
National Institute of Justice state a prosecutor should consent to testing
in many cases.278 “For example, when a rape case turned solely, or in
large part, on eyewitness testimony, where serology at the time was
inconclusive or not highly discriminating, and newer, more
discriminating tests are now available, the prosecutor should order DNA
testing.”279 Therefore, the need to avoid over-burdening the judicial
system would thus far appear not to be a concern—or at least, not
enough of a concern to override the interest in exonerating innocent
prisoners.
The myth of over-burdened courts due to post-conviction DNA
testing has also not come to fruition in Washington. According to the
Office of Public Defense, eighteen people have filed for relief under
RCW 10.73.170 since its enactment in 2005.280 In addition, according to
the Innocence Network’s amicus brief in Crumpton, “only three of the
state crime lab’s 967 backlogged DNA cases were the result of an RCW
10.73.170 petition.”281 Although these numbers do not fully represent
the pressure put on Washington courts and labs, they can help put the
burden into perspective. However, as Justice Stephens argues in her
dissent,282 the burdens on the system thus far have not taken into account
275. As of March 8, 2015, there have been 1560 total—DNA and non-DNA—exonerations
across the United States. The National Registry of Exonerations, supra note 40.
276. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 158.
277. Id.
278. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 40.
279. Id.
280. Memorandum from Wash. State Office of Pub. Def. (received Jan. 27, 2015) (noting that
motions are not required to be filed with the Office of Public Defense). Number is calculated using
motions filed with the Office of Public Defense after the March 9, 2015 enactment date. See WASH.
REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2014).
281. Amicus Curiae Brief of Innocence Network in Support of Petition for Review at 7–8, State
v. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d 252, 332 P.3d 448 (2014) (No. 88336–0).
282. Crumpton, 181 Wash. 2d at 271, 332 P.3d at 457.
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the favorable presumption found by the Court. Therefore, even if the
burden on the system does not outweigh the benefit of justice for the
wrongfully convicted now, the favorable presumption may open the door
for such a burden. However, any such argument at this point would be
speculative because the favorable presumption has thus far had limited
application.283
Additionally, as discussed previously in the context of the California
Penal Code, the Court’s reading of a favorable presumption into the
statute is consistent with cases interpreting statutes in other states with
similar “reasonable likelihood” language.284 As articulated by the
National Institute of Justice:
The “reasonable likelihood” prong ensures that the evidence to
be tested has probative value. Because it is impossible to know
the outcome of DNA testing in advance of actual testing, this
inquiry requires the court to presume favorable test results and
determine the significance of those favorable test results – that
is, whether it is ‘reasonable likely’ that favorable test results
would be probative enough to establish the applicant’s
innocence. The “reasonable probability” prong requires the court
to consider the probative value of favorable test results on the
case – not whether it thinks it is likely, as a matter of fact, that
the applicant is actually innocent.285
The Court’s holding in Crumpton is consistent with this analysis.
Although Justice Stephens’s well-reasoned dissent asserts many
complex policy considerations against reading a favorable presumption
into RCW 10.73.170, it is not clear that the concerns addressed by those
policy arguments have come to fruition. Creating a “revolving door” for
single perpetrator cases may conflict with the intent of the legislature,
but absent evidence of the evils the onerous standard was meant to
protect against, the countervailing interest in justice for the wrongfully
convicted weighs more heavily.
CONCLUSION
Post-conviction DNA testing is a valuable tool in ensuring the most
just outcomes in Washington’s criminal justice system. Given the
astonishing number of exonerations and the apparent myth of over283. See supra notes 208–30.
284. Supra notes 257–62262.
285. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 159 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Peterson,
836 A.2d 821, 827 (N.J. 2003); State v. DeMarco, 904 A.2d 797, 804 (N.J. 2006)).
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burdened courts, expanding access to post-conviction DNA testing is a
desirable result. Although the legislature intended to maintain an
onerous standard for access to post-conviction DNA testing, the
Washington State Supreme Court properly found the current legal and
social landscapes supported reading a favorable presumption into RCW
10.73.170. Evaluating motions for post-conviction DNA testing with a
presumption the DNA evidence requested would be favorable to the
petitioner is also consistent with the approaches of many other states.
Although federal law has not yet adopted the explicit favorable
presumption, Washington can consider itself among the trailblazers in
expanding access to justice through post-conviction DNA testing.

